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• A curious party at the biobank who tries: 
 To infer the genomic sequence of a patient from his stored genomic data. 
 To associate the type of genetic test with the patient being tested. 
 
• A curious party at the MK who tries: 
 To infer the genomic sequence of a patient from his stored cryptographic 
keys and the information provided by the biobank. 
 To associate the type of genetic test with the patient being tested. 
 
• A malicious party at the MU who tries to obtain the private genomic data of a 
patient for which it is not authorized. 
How the leakage of genomic data from short reads 
threatens the genomic privacy of a patient? 
 Without masking in place: 
 With masking in place: 
Genomic data leakage of the patient 
as a result of various disease 
susceptibility tests each requiring a 
different number of SNPs from 
different parts of the patient’s 
genome. 
The number of leaked nucleotides 
and SNPs is 0!! 
PARAMETERS: 
• Intel Core2 Duo CPU with dual-core 
2.5 GHz 
• Debian GNU/Linux 7.0 Operating 
System 
• Java implementation 
• MySQL 5.5 database server 
 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS: 
• Salsa20 Stream Cipher (64 bytes): CS 
+ SR content  
• OPE encryption: position 
• CCM mode of AES (256-bits): secure 
communication 
• RSA (2048-bits): public key encryption 
Patient CI Biobank MK MU 
1) Sample 
2) Sequencing and  
Encryption @ CI 
3) Encrypted short reads 
4) E[Requested range of nucleotides], ID of the MU, E[session key], E[consent]  
6) E[upper and lower bound of the range] 
7) Private retrieval of  
the reads @ biobank 
8) E[positions], E[CSs]  and random salts of short reads 
9) Construction of the  
masking vectors @ MK 
11) Masking @ biobank 
12) E[masked short reads], E[modified CSs] 
E[positions] and E[decryption keys] 
 
10) Masking request, E[modified CSs] 
E[positions] and E[decryption keys] 
5) E[Requested range of nucleotides], E[session key], E[consent]  
In order to support large-scale genomic studies, an increasing number of 
medical units (pharmaceutical companies or hospitals) are willing to outsource 
the storage of genomes generated in clinical trials.  
Raw data 
(FASTq) 
Full genome 
• Individual diagnosis 
• Personalized medicine 
• Tailored treatments 
• Statistics 
Deep / ultra-deep 
 sequencing 
SAM file 
(aligned reads) 
Samples Sequencing machine  
• Illumina, 
• Roche,  
• Life Technology,  
• … 
 
•  Sequence alignment/map (SAM) files are de facto standards used for all 
DNA sequence analyses. 
Example 
•  SAM files contains hundreds of millions of short reads randomly sampled from a 
human genome. 
EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS: 
• Response time is almost linear 
with the requested range size 
o For 10’000-nucleotides 
request on one patient  
 1 sec. 
 
• Concurrent requests: 
o For request size ≥ 10’000 
the number of concurrent 
clients highly affects the 
performance. 
 
• The system can handle a 
maximum of 200 clients for  request 
size ≥ 100’000.  
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THE FRAMEWORK AND THE PROTOCOL: 
•  SAM files are stored in an encrypted 
fashion at the biobank by using 
pseudonyms. 
•  Medical Units (MU) need to be 
approved institutions in order to request 
ranges of nucleotides 
•  The cryptographic keys of the patients 
are stored at the masking and key 
manager (MK) 
Because of its nature, the leakage of genomic data can pave the way 
to several abuses and threats: 
• Revelation of predisposition to diseases, ethnicity, paternity, filiation, etc. 
• Genetic discrimination. 
• Denial of access to health insurance, mortgage, education and employment 
• … 
THE MASKING TECHNIQUE: 
• Preventing the leakage of extra 
information in the SR to the MU 
o Positions of the SR external 
to requested range 
o Non-consented nucleotides 
by the patient 
• Encrypted SR are masked at 
the biobank 
• A short read (SR) contains the following privacy-sensitive information: 
• Position = position of the SR’s first aligned nucleotide with respect to the reference 
genome; 
• Cigar String (CS) = sequence of SR’s base lengths and the associated operation; 
• Sequence = SR’s content including the nucleotides from { A, T, C, G }. 
ENCRYPTED SHORT READ: 
• The position is encrypted 
using OPE 
• The CS is encrypted using 
a semantically secure 
symmetric encryption 
function 
• The content is encrypted 
using a stream cipher 
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